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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) services are unstoppably 
demanding more computing and storage resources. Aligned to 
this trend, cloud and fog computing came up as the proper 
paradigms meeting such IoT services demands. More recently, a 
new paradigm, so-called fog to cloud (F2C) computing, promises 
to make the most out of both Fog and Cloud, paving the way to 
new IoT services development. Nevertheless, the benefits of F2C 
architectures may be diminished by failures affecting the 
computing commodities. In order to withstand possible failures, 
the design of novel protection strategies, specifically designed for 
distributed computing scenarios is required. In this paper, we 
study the impact of distinct protection strategies on several key 
performance aspects, including service response time, and usage 
of computing resources. Numerical results indicate that under 
distinct failure scenarios, F2C significantly outperforms the 
conventional cloud. 
Keywords—Cloud computing; fog computing; fog-to-cloud 
computing; Internet of Things; service protection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Cloud Computing has gained momentum in 
future Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios, such as Smart Cities 
or Smart Transportation. This is mainly because Cloud 
computing properly addresses the ever increasing requirements 
of IoT services, related to both computing and storage 
capabilities [1]. Nevertheless, Cloud computing faces 
substantial challenges, such as large response time and global 
mobility support. These challenges cannot be overlooked for 
the envisioned massive IoT deployment. 
Fortunately, the advent of a new computing paradigm 
referred to as Fog computing promises to overcome the 
negative issues linked to Cloud [2].  The rationale behind Fog 
Computing is to move computing resources to the edge of the 
network, bringing two key benefits. First, IoT services can be 
deployed closer to the end-user, resulting in lower service 
response time. Second, the network core lightens its load by 
reducing traffic to/from cloud. Despite the fact that Fog 
computing cannot provide the massive storage capacity at 
cloud, Fog is more suitable for services requiring real time 
processing such as Healthcare or Smart Transportation. Indeed, 
rather than competing with Cloud, Fog computing looks 
forward to a scenario where both Cloud and Fog architectures 
collaborate to ease IoT services deployment. 
Motivated by the potential benefits to come from bringing 
together Fog and Cloud Computing, a new network 
architecture referred to as Fog-to-Cloud (F2C) computing has 
been recently proposed [3]. F2C leverages a hierarchical 
organization of existing resources into different layers, aiming 
at easing the development of new services, not properly 
supported by current fog or cloud computing paradigms, such 
as those based on collaborative models.  However, albeit 
several solutions for failure recovery have been proposed and 
successfully deployed in data center networks, resilience in fog 
computing is still an open challenge [4]. These concerns are 
inherited by F2C computing systems raising several challenges 
regarding augmented disruption probability caused by the high 
dynamicity observed in this architecture. 
In this work, we consider for service protection both the 
failure recovery delay and Protection Cost (Pcost), which is measured in terms of amount of resources reserved for 
recovery of eventual failures. This work is an extension of the 
one presented in [5], where failure recovery in F2C systems is 
assessed for the first time. However, it is with no doubt that 
more research efforts must be devoted to distill the challenges 
related to service protection in F2C scenarios. To fill this gap, 
this paper introduces and formulates the so-called Protected 
Service Allocation (PSA) problem in F2C scenarios. Put 
simply, the main goal of the PSA problem is to minimize the 
service response time and the Pcost considering both the amount of protection resources and their respective layer in the F2C 
topology, while avoiding the commodity nodes to get 
overloaded. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
discusses previous works dealing with fail recovery. Section III 
introduces the architectural model of the F2C architecture as 
well as the PSA problem formulation. In Section IV, 
simulation results are presented and discussed while Section V 
concludes the paper and suggests avenues for future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we highlight the main recent research 
studies dealing with the resilience of both Cloud and Fog 
Computing. There are myriad of research studies dealing with 
several resilience aspects of Cloud and Fog Computing. On 
one hand, studies available in [6]-[8] discuss the Cloud and 
Fog computing protection from a data security perspective.  
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Fig. 1. Fog-to-cloud (F2C) topology. 
These studies put major focus on the integrity and protection of 
the IoT data processed by the computing commodities. 
The work in [9] presents a strategy for failure recovery in 
Mobile Edge Computing (MEC). The proposed strategy 
offloads workload to neighbor MEC upon fail occurrence or 
current MEC overload. However, no protection scheme is 
proposed to guarantee the availability of resources on neighbor 
nodes. Authors in [10] discuss characteristics of distinct 
network resilience strategies including protection, where 
backup resources are reserved in advance, and restoration, 
where resources are allocated after failure occurrence. 
Although the fact that protection schemes yield lower delay 
recovery, restoration schemes are often preferred due the 
efficiency on resources allocation. However, we consider that 
protection strategies must be assessed in F2C systems, whose 
applications often require low delay recovery. 
The work presented in [5] is the first one to assess 
protection strategies in F2C computing systems. In that work, 
proactive and reactive strategies are confronted in order to 
illustrate pros and cons of each one. However, protection 
resources are always reserved in the same F2C layer of the 
resources actually allocated for service execution. Albeit 
benefits may be perceived in the proposed approach, it is worth 
assessing inter-layer protection strategies. 
III. MODELING THE PSA PROBLEM 
In this section, we introduce a topology model for the F2C 
architecture, the set of scenarios to be protected and, finally, 
we provide the analytical model for the PSA problem. 
A. Topology Model 
As shown in Fig. 1, the evaluated F2C topology consists of 
both Fog and Cloud commodities, all hierarchically distributed 
into three distinct vertical layers. The layer distribution is 
determined by the capacity, vicinity, and reachability to end-
users consuming the IoT service. We assume the following 
topological assessments: 
 End-users to be connected through two distinct Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs), one serving as the primary 
access and the other one as backup. 
 The network infrastructure is owned by ISPs, but Cloud 
and Fog commodities do not. 
 Cloud premises can be reached through any of the ISPs. 
However, certain Fog resources can only be reached 
through a certain ISP. Recall that not all nodes of an 
access layer belong to the same ISP. Indeed, we 
consider that the envisioned F2C layer distribution fits 
both commercial and networking availability 
requirements of end-users and ISPs. 
 Each fog layer consists of several fog domains, 
hereinafter referred to as fog nodes. It is worth 
mentioning that the fog node concept is not yet clearly 
defined in the literature, and we are not going deep into 
this discussion. Rather, in this paper, we use the name 
fog node as a fog domain. 
 In this paper, we deal with fog node failures (low 
granularity) as we assume that failures of individual 
edge-devices (high granularity) demands distinct 
protection strategies. 
 Cloud providers implement their own resilience 
schemes so that the strategies employed in this work 
consider only failures in Fog nodes. 
From a top-down perspective, the first layer is the Cloud 
layer. The Cloud layer provides near unlimited computing and 
storage resources, but with a significant cost in service 
transmission time. The next layer is the so-called Fog layer 2, 
or simply Fog-2. This layer embraces mobile as well as static 
edge-devices, providing resource aggregation in a 
neighborhood wide area, such as vehicles in a parking lot, or a 
set of buildings. Fog-2 nodes offer medium capacity and lower 
service transmission time in comparison with Cloud. The last 
layer is the so-called Fog layer 1, or simply Fog-1, which 
solely embraces mobile edge-devices, geographically close to 
end-users, which results in low allocation time. However,   
Fog-1 nodes show limited capacity and computing resources in 
comparison with upper layers in the hierarchy. As it can be 
seen in Fig. 1, 2 and 4 fog nodes are included in Fog-2 and 
Fog-1, respectively. 
It is intuitive the clear interest in shifting services execution 
from the Cloud to the Fog layers in order to lower their 
transmission time. In addition, there are some concerns among 
ISPs related to the increase on bandwidth motivated by 
executing services at cloud. On the other hand, however, the 
execution of services solely at the fog layer is undoubtedly 
affected by the volatility inherent to devices at the edge—
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motivated for example by energy saving policies or the 
intrinsic mobility of the edge devices. 
It is worth highlighting the wide set of potential use-cases 
the F2C architecture may contribute to. Consider for example a 
medical assistance service in a smart city, where fog devices 
can change traffic lights color to accommodate the emergency 
squad to reach quickly the occurrence spot, whereas in a 
parallel manner the Cloud can look for emergency medical 
services discovery and location. A different example deserving 
specific attention focuses on ISP traffic offloading. Indeed, an 
ISP provider may take real-time decisions matching real-time 
resources availability in the F2C architecture to offload traffic 
among the different layers, thus enabling traffic load balance 
while minimizing the traffic to be handled by the network core. 
In this paper, we consider two failure scenarios: 1) failure 
of one single fog node, where any fog node may become 
inaccessible in Fog layer 1 or Fog layer 2; and 2) general 
failure in one area (see Fig. 1), affecting one fog layer 2 and all 
fogs layer 1 directly connected to the compromised fog in layer 
2 (hierarchical failure). For instance, as shown in Fig. 1, during 
the service execution (1), a hierarchical failure (2) may cause 
disruption on the service execution (3), however, the 
employment of protection resources (4) may guarantee its 
accomplishment. On the other hand, for the sake of simplicity, 
we assume cloud service providers to handle failures through 
the proper protection mechanisms. Therefore, in this paper we 
focus on the resilience of fog nodes. 
B. Protection Strategies for F2C scenarios 
In this subsection, we present the different protection 
strategies evaluated in this paper. 
1) Horizontal Protection: In this strategy, the resources 
devoted for protection are allocated at the same F2C layer 
running the service. The deployment of a horizontal protection 
eases the recovery of services execution in resources with 
similar computing capabilities. In this way, service-level 
agreements are more highly to be respected in case of failures 
events. 
2) Vertical Protection: This protection strategy allocates 
computing resources for protection at the immediately higher 
F2C layer. This strategy focus on diminishing the average 
delay for service allocation by employing the lowest fog layer 
exclusively for primary allocation. 
3) Hybrid Protection: In the hybrid strategy, the selection 
of computing resources for protection is not dependent of the 
layer organization. The rationale behind this approach is to 
reduce the resource underutilization perceived in vertical 
protection strategy. For instance, in the topology shown in 
Fig. 1, idle fog resources in layer 1 could be used for 
protection in low load scenarios, whilst, in high load 
scenarios, protection could be allocated in higher layer 
resources, releasing lower latency resources for primary 
allocation. 
4) Hierarchical Horizontal Protection: This strategy is 
designed to withstand failures affecting a local area, where 
neighbors Fog-1 and Fog-2 nodes are unavailable for service 
execution. Similar to horizontal protection, the computing 
resources selected for protection are positioned in the same 
layer of the ones selected for service execution, but, distinct 
from that strategy, hierarchical protection is placed 
exclusively on fog nodes positioned in a distinct area (area not 
affected, in Fig. 1). 
5) Hierarchical Vertical Protection: This strategy is also 
suitable for dealing with local area failures. Similar to vertical 
protection, computed resources devoted for protection are 
located at higher layers. However, in this strategy, the amount 
of protection slots reserved in the cloud must be enough for 
the allocation of all primary resources used in one area. 
We must highlight that the protection strategies so-called 
horizontal, vertical and hybrid protection, assume the failure of 
one computing node not to affect other nodes connectivity 
(these strategies are designed to deal with single-failure events 
affecting solely one computing node, hence not handling 
networking infrastructure or several computing nodes failures). 
However, hierarchical protection strategies are designed for 
topology configurations where the failure of a critical 
networking node, such as a gateway router or the multiple-
failure of computing nodes, disrupts the execution of services 
on a particular area embracing both Fog-1 and Fog-2 nodes. 
C. PSA Problem Mathematical Model 
In this section, we model the PSA problem as a 
Multidimensional Knapsack Problem (MKP), presenting model 
details in a comprehensive manner. The model objective is 
two-fold: 1) reducing the latency for service allocation; and 
2) reducing the Pcost. Therefore, the objective function (1) minimizes the sum of the allocation delay for each service in 
the set S as well as the sum of the recovery delay offered by 
each F2C resources in the set R according to the amount of 
resources employed for protection purposes. All symbols 
employed in the model are described in Table 1. 
TABLE I. MODEL SYMBOLS DEFINITION 
Symbol Definition 
Di Transmission delay related to service i, considering just the primary slots 
Pr Transmission delay related to service recovery using protection slots of resource r 
S Set of services to be executed 
Ui Total number of slots required to run service i  
R Set of F2C resources, i.e., set of cloud and distinct fog nodes 
Kr Set of slots provided by F2C resource r for both execution and protection 
Ln Set of fog nodes available on Fog layer n 
Hr Set of fog nodes positioned immediately under F2C resource r considering F2C hierarchy 
Fr Set of fog nodes in the same fog layer of fog r 
Gr Set of all F2C resources in the layer immediately above fog r 
Tr Allocation delay of a slot in F2C resource r, according to its F2C layer 
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Min: ∑ 𝐷௜௜∈ௌ ൅ ∑ 𝑃௥௥∈ோ  
It must be remarked that the total computing capacity of 
both cloud and fog nodes are measured in terms of slot units. 
The so-called primary slots are the slots allocated for service 
execution, whereas the secondary slots are the slots selected for 
protection purposes. We consider that the minimum amount of 
slots required by a service is 1 slot unit. However, a service 
requiring more than 1 slot unit may be allocated in distinct F2C 
nodes and even in distinct F2C layers, as long as a F2C node 
has enough capacity, i.e., a service can be allocated regardless 
the service type. 
It is worth noticing that services are executed in parallel. 
Therefore, in this scenario, a service execution delay is equal to 
the delay of the service slot allocated in the higher F2C layer, 
i.e., the one with the highest transmission delay. 
The allocation of primary and secondary slots is 
respectively modeled as: 
𝑌௜,௥,௞ ൌ ൝
1, if service 𝑖 is allocated in resource 𝑟
consuming primary slot 𝑘
0, otherwise
 
𝑋௥,௞ ൌ ൝
1, if resource 𝑟 has its slot 𝑘 reserved as
a protection slot
0, otherwise
 
Moreover, the following constraints are assumed. The total 
transmission delay related to primary slots is defined by (2). 
The total transmission delay related to protection slots 
(recovery delay) is defined by (3), where the overall protection 
delay of each fog-1 or fog-2 node equals the number of slots 
consumed for protection multiplied by the delay of a single 
transmission to this node. 
 ∑ ∑ 𝑌௜,௥,௞ ∗ 𝑇௥௞∈௄ೝ௥∈ோ ൌ  𝐷௜ , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 
 ∑ 𝑋௥,௞ ∗ 𝑇௥௞∈௄ೝ ൌ  𝑃௥ , ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
Constraint (4) is responsible for assuring the complete 
allocation of each service in the set S. It must be noticed that 
this constraint takes into consideration only the complete 
allocation of primary resources. Therefore, the total amount of 
primary slots allocated in both cloud and fog resources for each 
service must be equal to the number of slots required by the 
respective service. 
Constraints (5) and (6) define the exclusivity and capacity 
constraints. The former ensures that each consumed slot is 
allocated as either one primary slot or one secondary slot, 
whilst the latter ensures that a computing (resource) node can 
be allocated for service execution or protection whenever it has 
at least one available slot. 
 ∑ ∑ 𝑌௜,௥,௞௞∈௄ೝ௥∈ோ ൌ 𝑈௜ , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 
 ∑ 𝑌௜,௥,୩௜∈ௌ ൅ 𝑋௥,୩  ൑ 1 , ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 ∧  ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾௥ 
 ∑ ∑ 𝑌௜,௥,௞௞∈௄ೝ௜∈ௌ ൅ ∑ 𝑋௥,௞௞∈௄ೝ ൑ |𝐾௥| , ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
Moreover, some specific constraints are defined to model 
properly the distinct protection strategies described in 
Section III-B. For horizontal protection, (7) is considered. It 
ensures the availability of protection slots in the same layer for 
any protected slot in Fog-1 or Fog-2, respectively represented 
by L1 and L2. In addition to this equation, the hierarchical horizontal protection strategy is modeled by (8). This equation 
ensures the availability of the protection slots for recovery in 
case of a failure affecting primary slots allocated in both Fog-2 
and Fog-1, i.e., a failure affecting the network connectivity to 
both Fog-1 and Fog-2, or a multiple-failure scenario affecting 
both Fog-1 and Fog-2 nodes. 
∑ ∑ 𝑌௜,௥,௞௞∈௄ೝ௜∈ௌ  ൑  ∑ ∑ 𝑋௤,௞௞∈௄೜௤∈ிೝିሼ௥ሽ  ,    
∀𝑟 ∈ 𝐿ଵ ൅ 𝐿ଶ 
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑌௜,௤,௞௞∈௄೜௤∈ுೝ௜∈ௌ ൑  ∑ ∑ 𝑋௤,௞௞∈௄೜௤∈௅భିுೝ  ,    
∀𝑟 ∈ 𝐿ଶ 
Focusing on the vertical protection strategies, (9) ensures 
that the amount of protection slots in a layer is enough for the 
recovery of any F2C node failure in the layer below. Moreover, 
(10) ensures the availability of protection slots for hierarchical 
vertical recovery of any Fog layer 2 node failure. 
 ∑ ∑ 𝑌௜,௥,௞௞∈௄ೝ௜∈ௌ ൑  ∑ ∑ 𝑋௤,௞௞∈௄೜௤∈ீೝ  ,   
∀𝑟 ∈ 𝐿ଵ ൅ 𝐿ଶ ,                     if vertical strategy
∀𝑟 ∈ 𝐿ଵ  if hierarchical vertical strategy
 ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑌௜,௤,௞௞∈௄೜௤∈ுೝାሼ௥ሽ௜∈ௌ ൑  ∑ ∑ 𝑋௤,௞௞∈௄೜௤∈ீೝ  ,    
∀𝑟 ∈ 𝐿ଶ 
Another protection strategy implemented in this work 
consists in a hybrid of horizontal and vertical protection 
strategies. This approach is modeled by (11), whose priority is 
the allocation of primary slots in resources located in lower 
layers (for reducing the transmission delay) but also allowing 
the use of spare resources in the same layer for protection slots. 
 ∑ ∑ 𝑌௜,௥,௞௞∈௄ೝ௜∈ௌ ൑  ∑ ∑ 𝑋௤,௞௞∈௄೜௤∈ோ  ,    
∀𝑟 ∈ 𝐿ଵ ൅ 𝐿ଶ | 𝑞 ് 𝑟
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we present numerical results related to the 
evaluation of both transmission delay and Pcost. All plotted values have a 95% confidence interval. The presented 
numerical results were obtained by means of the well-known 
optimization tools PuLP [11] and Gurobi Optimizer [12]. In 
addition, Tables 2 and 3 summarize the set of simulation 
parameters used in the trials. 
TABLE II. SIMULATION PARAMETERS: SERVICES 
Parameter Value 
Number of requested services From 10 to 150 
Ratio between amount of services:  
low consuming (mice) / high consuming 
(elephants) 
90 (low) /  
10 (high) 
Slots demanded by mice  3 
Slots demanded by elephants  30 
Future Technologies Conference (FTC) 2017 
29-30 November 2017 | Vancouver, Canada 
537 | P a g e  
 
TABLE III. SIMULATION PARAMETERS: F2C RESOURCES 
Parameter Fog-1 Fog-2 Cloud 
Number of F2C nodes per layer 4 fogs 2 fogs 1 cloud 
Available resources per F2C node 20 200 Nearly unlimited 
Transmission delay per F2C layer 1 ms 2 ms 10 ms 
 (a) 
 (b) 
Fig. 2. Average service transmission delay: (a) primary slots; (b) protection 
slots. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the impact on the average service 
transmission delay for each PSA strategy. As it may be seen in 
Fig. 2(a), the deployment of horizontal protection strategies 
leads to a substantial increase on the average service 
transmission delay in contrast to hybrid and both vertical 
protection strategies even for a relatively low number of 
services. On the other hand, the delay related to protection slots 
(recovery delay), shown by Fig. 2(b), uncovers the tradeoff 
perceived on protection strategies. Albeit horizontal protection 
strategies cannot offer low impact on resource allocation delay 
for a medium to high number of services, the recovery delay is 
considerably lower than other strategies, even with a high 
amount of services. In fact, the increasing number of services 
does not affect the protection latency in horizontal strategies 
since the amount of protection slots in lower fog layers will be 
enough for the recovery of any fog node failure, whereas the 
premature extinguishment of free primary resources in lower 
layers enforces the allocation of new services in the cloud, 
increasing the primary allocation delay, as seen in Fig. 2(a). 
However, vertical protection strategies offer low impact on the 
primary delay at the cost of a high latency recovery, i.e., the 
delay related to the protection slots.  
 
Fig. 3. Average resource allocation distribution in Fog-1. 
It is worth noticing that the primary delay observed in the 
hybrid strategy is comparable to the one offered by vertical 
protection strategies. However, the service recovery delay is 
significantly affected by the amount of service requests. 
The high recovery latency observed in vertical strategies is 
explained through the analysis of resource allocation in the 
lowest fog layer (the one more vulnerable to congestion and 
lack of computing resources), depicted by Fig. 3. 
One can notice that all resources are allocated as primary 
slots in vertical strategies even when there are free resources 
available in this layer, inhibiting the low delay recovery, 
whereas the hybrid strategy makes use of spare resources for 
protection purposes. Moreover, this figure shows that the 
resource utilization in Fog-1 can be as low as 50% for 
hierarchical horizontal strategies, whereas a horizontal strategy 
achieves a utilization ratio of 75%, also giving ground for the 
previously presented analysis regarding the low recovery delay 
in horizontal strategies enabled by high availability of 
protection resources in lower layers. 
On the other hand, Fig. 4 shows cloud resources allocation 
under distinct protection strategies. Fig. 4(a) is devoted to 
illustrate the primary resource allocation. For sake of 
comparison, we include the amount of allocated slots for an 
exclusive cloud allocation strategy, which consists in the 
employment of cloud as the unique available resource for 
service execution—traditional cloud scenarios. As may be 
noticed by the reader, as the employment of horizontal 
strategies increases the employment of fog resources for 
protection purposes, more cloud resources must be used for 
primary slots allocation in comparison to vertical and hybrid 
strategies. In contrast, the analysis of Fig. 4(b), where the 
amount of resources employed in cloud resources for 
protection purposes is represented, shows that horizontal 
strategies have minimum load in cloud resources. In fact, this is 
explained by the assumption that cloud providers implement 
their own resilience strategies. Once more, we added exclusive 
cloud allocation results in this figure, where the first—Excl. 
alloc.—is the allocation of secondary slots demanded by the 
recovery of any single fog failure, while the second—Excl. 
alloc. (Hier.)—considers the allocation of secondary resources 
for one area failure recovery, as earlier discussed in this paper. 
Future Technologies Conference (FTC) 2017 
29-30 November 2017 | Vancouver, Canada 
538 | P a g e  
 
 (a) 
 (b) 
Fig. 4. Resource allocation  distribution in the Cloud: (a) primary slots; (b) 
protection slots. 
Based on the obtained results, we can see that albeit F2C 
can significantly reduce the amount of resources consumed in 
higher layers and the service transmission time, distinct 
protection strategies must be considered for distinct scenarios 
aiming at the employment of the most suitable one, regarding 
to specific demands of each scenario. For instance, fog nodes 
providing sensitive services, such as healthcare and Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS), might leverage horizontal 
strategies to ensure low delay recovery, whereas fog nodes 
supporting no sensitive applications with high resource 
consuming, such as video streaming, may make use of vertical 
or hybrid strategies. In both cases, services can be executed in 
a reliable way, not overusing cloud resources. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Fog-to-Cloud architectures (F2C) have emerged as an 
innovative technology to fulfill the ever increasing 
requirements of IoT scenarios. In this work, we put the focus 
on studying distinct protection techniques aimed at increasing 
the resilience level of F2C architectures. To this end, we 
present an extensive evaluation related to the minimization of 
both service transmission delay and protection cost in 
protection scenarios, and important factors for obtaining low 
latency in reliable IoT service execution. The presented results 
showed that the selection of a protection strategy has a 
substantial impact on the service execution and resilience 
performance. 
As a future line of work, we plan to study how the service 
discovery process is affected when F2C resilience is 
considered as well as to evaluate the impact of power 
consumption on failure scenarios. 
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